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HAVE CANADIANS FAILED TO INNOVATE? 
THE BROWN THESIS REVISITED 
Christian de Bresson* 
(Received 28 June 1981. Revised/Accepted 14 January 1982.) 
INTRODUCTION 
The common prejudice about innovation in Canada is simple: 
there is no innovation. Other versions of the myth are: 
Canadians are conservative and do not have an entrepreneurial 
drive; capitalist 'animal spirits' do not really function in 
Canada. All of this implies that the capitalist nerve fails 
in Canada, and entrepreneurial endeavours are virtually non-
existent. 
One of the most influential books promoting this view is 
J.J. Brown's Idea* in Exile.. It rests in numbers in the 
racks of the main undergraduate university libraries across 
the country as the only broad empirical source about inven-
tions and innovations in Canada. In it, Brown had the merit 
to bring a wealth of examples and empirical facts to light. 
Because of this, some of the conclusions of his book have 
pervasively influenced journalistic comments, semi-academic 
work, and even themes of some government policy reports. 
Glossy presentations, such as the Canadian Invention* Book, 
echo Brown's ideas. The lack of an alternative analysis had 
made Idea* in Exile, largely contributive in shaping public 
opinion about technological innovation. 
Until an alternative set of facts disproves lde.a* in Exile. 
and counteracts its broad influence, it is necessary to ex-
pose some of the questionable common public assumptions pro-
moted by J.J. Brown about innovations in Canada. It is our 
responsibility, as social scientists, to diffuse the findings 
of this work to the public in order to reveal and undermine 
prejudices and idiosyncracies. This will help increase pub-
lic awareness and progressively generate a demand for the 
right type of research. 
The Science Council of Canada has recently uncovered a set 
of facts which may suggest quite another picture for indus-
trial innovation in Canada. However, until the findings are 
validated in further work, all the results should be regarded 
as provisional findings at this time. Whereas 'scientific 
knowledge is international by nature ... technologies ... re-
flect fairly fully the differences of level of economic de-
velopment and in the ways of life adopted by the various 
societies.'1 Furthermore, according to J.D. Bernai's 
* New Westminster, B.C. 
11 
definition, technologies are a set of personally acquired procedures of production which cannot be transplanted simply.2 All production processes require the contribution of a specific *know-how' that assumes some understanding of natural phenomena and of the means available for mastering them. It is in this way that the link between science and technology is established. 
Every society evolves its own technology, embodied in tools and skills. Societies with increasing population and pro-duction have had to make choices about investment in machin-ery and qualifications of manpower. Except in primitive and stagnant economics where investments are only made to re-place outworn equipment, without in any. way changing the technology, investment is always accompanied by 6omc mçahvJic 
o£ technological Innovation.^ This implies, contrary to j.J. Brown, that economic growth and investment in Canada e-volves and generates its own innovation. Canada, as a grow-ing, society, had to make investment choices and has had, perforce, to privately and/or collectively appropriate pro-cedures of production and evolve its technology — even if only through adaptation. 
Where in Canada does one expect the technology to evolve? Wherever domestic demand is supplied by domestic production, one can expect a shift in the demand to motivate correspond-ing change by the supplier, resulting in new or modified products. Similarly, any price pressures exerted by domestic demand can stimulate the domestic supplier to introduce a production process change or improvement. 
Our study also examined all substantial production for ex-port, on the premise that a change of demand abroad will cause Canadian suppliers to institute technological changes. Furthermore, it was assumed that wherever Canada had been in-volved in production for any amount of time, its assimilation of production processes and procedures led to a growth in either adaptive or innovative know-how. Specific local con-ditions are bound to generate specific needs but there should only be a random chance that these would generate only pre-viously-established technological responses. 
THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
Having delineated our broad field of study, we sought to es-tablish where the increments of technological know-how devel-oped. What were the indicators of technical modification, improvements and establishment of new ways of doing things? One knows very little of the pfiocz&6 through which techno-logical change and innovation occur. Studies that tried to discriminate between successful and unsuccessful innovations have been inconclusive. However, it has been established that innovation involves close interaction of economic actors, be it in success or failure. Once innovation has established an interaction between a set of economic actors, the inter-action tends to become interative. 
An example of this is MacMillan-Bloedel, which acts as an 
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oligopsomy in British Columbia for logging, sawmilling, 
pulping equipment, and wood product transportation, began 
to integrate its different lines of operation on the West 
coast in the early 1950s. These lines included logs, lum-
ber, newsprint and other wood products. With vast timber 
leases on the West coast, it wanted to orient the harvested 
timber either to sawmills, or mechanical or chemical pulp 
mills to maximize the value of its resource according to 
needs in production and variations of the market price of 
newsprint or lumber and board. Mechanization of the harvest-
ing and logging operation, which occurred in the late For-
ties with the introduction of special tractors — the four-
wheel articulated skidder that brought the cut timber from 
where it was felled to the first logging road and diesel 
trucking with radio communications, allowed forest-product 
manufacturing to bè removed further away from the harvesting 
areas. The combination of these developments, along with the 
fact that the immediate vicinities of waterways had been har-
vested, led MacMillan-Bloedel to integrate all its production 
in the lower inland Pacific coast waters. 
The key problem was how to transport logs efficiently on the 
Pacific inland waters. Pushing booms with boom-dozers or 
pulling them with tugs would lose many logs, impeding navi-
gation. This also resulted in the logs being brought back 
a second time by beachcombers, often damaged. Boom-bundling 
was costly and complicated in the bush. If loading logs on 
to a barge near the harvesting port appeared conceivable, un-
loading barges near the mills in urban areas was very costly 
and took too much time. MacMillan-Bloedel approached 
Vancouver naval architects who were no longer occupied by war 
production. They came up with a simple idea. If one could 
flood the ballasts of barges from one side, the barges would 
capsize and release their load, saving all the time of un-
loading. 
The naval architects then approached Burrard Dry Docks who 
had built the first self-dumping barge in the early Fifties. 
At first, these were pulled by tugs or pushed by boom-dozers. 
An interaction fertile of innovation was established. The 
self-dumping barges were then improved to include self-loading 
cranes. The second generation had emerged: the self-loading, 
self-dumping barge. Later, in the early Seventies, Yarrows 
Ship Yard near Victoria built self-propelled, self-loading, 
self-dumping barges. The innovative interaction had become 
iterative. 
There are numerous examples of this sort. All such examples 
resemble case-specific stories. But they all have commonali-
ties: a user and a supplier got together to solve a specific 
techno-economic problem. How could one record the occurren-
ces of modification and/or generation of technology and the 
instances of the accumulation of know-how? To answer this 
question, we posed another: what are the means of communi-
cations between suppliers and users? They include trade and 
professional journals, trade fair experts that act as gate-
keepers, technical societies and meetings, etc. 
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Financed by Industry, Trade and Commerce, the writer scanned at the University of British Columbia two main media of com-munication. First, three hundred experts responded to a sur-vey and/or were interviewed. Secondly, all trade journals relating to industries of involvement in Canada were scanned for a rough description of an innovation, an approximate date of commercial introduction, and the name of a firm be-lieved to have commercialized it. In the fall of 1978, each firm was asked to confirm these facts. The definition of innovation used was Schumpeterfs : a commercialized new com-bination of production means to suit a given need. Either the means or the need or the combination had to be new. 
How did this definition enable us to distinguish innovation from incremental improvement in production? All innovation by our definition implied some measure of discontinuity in the production process. For example: 
- the Foudrinier paper-making machine had to be replaced by the twin wire paper-making machine (Papriformer) of Dominion Engineering in Abitibi paper plant (major innovation); or 
- the Foudrinier machine had to be rebuilt with a new felt to increase its speed (minor improvement innovation); or 
- during the down-time of the machine, it had to be fitted with a quality control instrument to measure the humidity or the glaze of the paper 
(accessory innovation). 
But in all cases, innovation involved discontinuity in the production process. As Schumpeter points out, it involves replacing one production function relating a set of factors (or ingredients of production) to the output (product) by another production function. The description of the innova-tion not only involves giving the description of the ingred-ients and their relative proportion (the starting point of a recipe)^ but also some description of the order and nature of the 'cooking' operations of the ingredients. If one fails to look into the order and nature of the operation, one rare-ly captures technical change. By describing this discontin-uity in the order and nature of operations, we attempted to capture it. 
A Canadian innovation was defined as the first production of a product in Canada or the first use of a process in Canada for the purposes of commercial production. The borderlines of the field were not discrete. For example, harvesting machinery made in Scandinavia for first use in Canada quali-fied as a 'Canadian innovation* according to our definition, alongside the first commercial use in the world of heavy water nuclear power generation (an imported scientific know-how) . Even the production, in Canada, of a piece of machin-ery only used abroad qualified as a 'Canadian innovation.' 
In addition, we did not assume any discontinuity between the 
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adaptation of foreign technology, incremental change and 
major innovation. Often, interaction between two industries, 
at the beginning, only breeds incremental changes for adap-
tation. In this way, know-how is accumulated enabling the 
initiation of major technological changes. This reasoning 
led us to expect that at least incremental technological 
change of an adaptive nature compounded, would lead to some 
major innovations. Our data will be available to all re-
searchers . 
J.J. BROWN'S THESIS 
Brown's ideas may be summed up in the following quote: 
I have collected many examples of inventions 
where we had a genuine world first. In some cases 
we had a commanding head-start on the rest of the 
world, amounting to as much as twenty years, yet 
we never have been able to make one of these head-
starts, presented to us as a gift by some dedicated 
individual, pay off for us in terms of world 
prestige and dollars. Time after time, we have 
gotten there first after a magnificent sprint, 
and then stood idly around for years waiting to 
collect the risk capital required to get the 
industry going. Usually by the time we have 
solved the financial problem, other less torpid 
nations have caught up with us and passed us. 
This happened with the variable pitch propeller, 
with the jet-liner, with the automatically con-
trolled machine tool, with the electric organ....7 
If Brown were to remain coherent with his main statement 
that Canadian inventions go abroad to be developed into full-
fledged commercial innovations, he should have checked the 
proportion of Canadian inventions that go abroad. Then, to 
further contend that Canada lacks development nerve, Brown 
should also have checked foreign inventions developed com-
mercially in Canada. 
Plutonium production with heavy water, for example, was de-
veloped in Canada with British, Scandinavian and French know-
how — not with a Canadian invention — although once the pro-
cess got started, some was forthcoming. Synthetic rubber-
making through the Bromo-Butyl process was a Canadian first 
of Polymer Corporation (now Polysar), but the technology was 
not Canadian at the inception. Pratt and Whitney's PT6 
engine was an innovation with considerable impact on the size 
of planes but, again, the technology was not Canadian. 
All the above are obvious cases of commercially viable tech-
nological developments which brought massive business to 
Canada and allowed Canada to build up technological know-how; 
but for these, Canada, as is to be expected, was dependent on 
a foreign technological service which Brown did not consider 
in his research. These examples are enough to indicate that 
Canada is involved in entrepreneurial activity. 
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Brown further states, 'The paradox that enlivens the history of Canadian invention is that Canada is a great producer of ideas yet has no native technical industries.* By 'native industries' Brown may be referring to industries which de-veloped based exclusively on domestic science and technology. But very few industries develop in this way. There is always some measure of adaptation involved in the innovation pro-cess. As a sample of this, we chose Canadian inventions re-ferred to in Chapters 12 and 13 of Xàuah In Exltz covering the post-war period to the mid-1960s. A selection of twenty of these of known date will suffice to illustrate the point. We have added in parentheses next to each invention either 'S' for commercialized or 'E' for not commercialized yet or 'exiled.'8 Even a cursory examination of the inventions tends to give us a different picture. Canadian successes in tech-nology seem to emerge in the traditional areas of strength of the Canadian economy: the recovery of high value per vol-ume goods ('staples'), their transport over large distance, with the corresponding development of specialized high speed transportation crafts (airplanes, boats, off-road vehicles), the tapping and transmission of energy over long distances, etc. 
Jacob Schmookler, in Invention and Economic Growth, showed that if one classified patents by using industry, one would find a relationship between the rate of patent registry and the economic growth of an industry.9 This does not imply, however, that the registered inventive activity of a specific nationality correlates with the industry's growth in that same country. Hence, there is no a pfuLofui reason why native Canadian innovations should stem from indigenous inventions. Of course, snowmobile inventions are to be expected in snowy countries and will most likely be developed into innovations in those countries. However, the key invention of the rubber tread which enabled the Bombardier snowmobile to become re-liable was a product applicable to many conveyor technolo-gies world wide. But Brown implies that local invention should be developed locally. 
DO FIRMS PREFER DOMESTICALLY-GROWN TECHNOLOGY? 
Technical know-how in Canada is bound to facilitate the assim-ilation of international knowledge just as much as to pro-mote domestic production of knowledge. No solution of con-tinuity exists between assimilation, adaptation and inven-tion. It is expected that a large share of technological developments in Canada be made with imported ideas, if only because Canadian needs will be met with ideas taken from the international stock of inventions to which Canada contributed a share. 
J.J. Brown's journalistic work was based on a false assump-tion that the conditions that preside over the inventive ac-tivity also determine the innovative activity and that Canadian firms should give preference to Canadian-grown in-ventions. It is these assumptions which blur the lines be-tween proprietary and non-proprietary technical knowledge and often discard the second. Temporary monopoly in the 
16 
application of knowledge is important to a firm initiating 
change. The trade secret is the best means of securing this. 
A set of patents is the second best means; and an exclusive 
licence the third best means. But firms have little reason 
to prefer domestic inventions to foreign ones. A national 
community may do so but this has not been the orientation of 
the Canadian government's policy. 
The contemporary and growing need of firms to perform their 
own research and development stems from the concern about 
know-how raonopoly. The best way of being able to cash in on 
research findings made in research establishments before 
they become public — and unusable for business — is to per-
form some measure of basic research in-house. In-house re-
search tunes in the firm to on-going, promising research and 
enables the acquisition of proprietary rights early enough 
in time. 
Moreover, all societies generate technologies that tend to 
fully reflect their own level of development and their own 
way of doing things. Because technologies are privately and 
individually assimilated means of producing, they reflect 
the specificities of socio-economic development. An inquiry 
into technological innovation in Canada, therefore, should 
not proceed from the image of what innovation should be, 
according to a foreign model, but rather what innovation is 
in relation to specific production processes in Canada. It 
is our contention that Brown started with a US model in mind, 
projected it onto Canada and, as expected, found it did not 
fit. But why should Canada innovate in the same streams as 
our southern neighbour? 
Our own data on Canadian innovations from 1947 to 1976 indi-
cates technological development in the following areas: 
power generating equipment and power transmission systems; 
radio, radar and telecommunications; logging and pulping; 
mining, milling and smelting; surveying and mappingy scien-
tific, medical, control instrumental and avionics; sorting, 
material handling, packaging and transportation systems; 
special purpose transport equipment. 
USER ORIENTATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCTION 
The user 'pull' and demand of existing economic activity is 
very often more important in orienting technological change 
than domestically available inventions. User demand enables 
us, in large measure, to explain successes. Its absence 
throws light on the underlying causes of failure. Consider 
Brown's 'exiled1 invention, the automatically-controlled 
machine tool. There is very little mass production of manu-
factured goods in Canada; little machinery is thus manufac-
tured to answer the needs of such production. Machinery and 
equipment making in Canada are often custom oriented, a one-
shot affair. The prerequisite standardization of production 
operations required for numerically controlled machine tools 
does not exist. 
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Nor is Canada prone to the mass production of consumer goods such as zippers. Another example of a mass consumer goods, invented and 'exiled,' is the 'electric kettle.* The reasons inventions are exiled often seem due to the lack of pull in Canada and existing demand elsewhere. However, Montréal is the world centre for panty hose. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize. 
The exceptions are also illustrative of the user orientation of technical change. Bombardier is one of the rare manufac-turers in Canada to have evolved performance vehicles into a dominant engineering design for standardized production: the snowmobile. It achieved this in a domain where a US manufacturer had previously failed. Off-road vehicles, packaging machinery and mass production of standardized homes are exceptional areas for innovation. All of these areas benefit in Canada from conditions which are more favourable than in the USA, thus creating a demand pull for the tech-nologies . 
BROWN'S DEFICIENT CONCEPTS 
Brown's errors are essentially methodological. He defines innovation and invention in a way as to lose their distinc-tion. He states, 'an "invention" is an idea embodied into a piece of physical equipment which provides some goods or service we did not have before. An "innovation" is all the above except it does hot have to be embodied in any physical equipment.'12 Schumpeter's definition of innovation would have been more appropriate as an object of his study as it clearly distinguishes between a non-commercialized invention and a commercialized one. 
He then goes on to define a 'Canadian invention' in a debat-able way: 'My working definition of a "Canadian invention" is that either the inventor was educated here or the basic concept for this invention came to him while he was living in Canada.'13 This definition has shortcomings. Since scientific knowledge has been organized internationally, in-teractions between researchers over national boundaries appear to be more, or at least as important as, nationality. Linguistic groups are more crucial to communication of ideas than citizenship. Moreover, inventors always have a higher-than-normal percentage of immigrants. 
Using Brown's definition, Bell's telephone becomes 'Canadian.' From the same standpoint, heavy water plutonium production should be British, but Brown classifies it under 'Canadian' innovations. He includes many foreign inventions commercially developed in Canada when it suits him. Even if he had limit-ed himself to trade journals and interviews of key people (which he did) rather than for commercialized inventions, he would have come up with the list similar to ours145 240 items amongst 4,100 items for which there are at least two different information sources (a trade journal, an expert, two experts, etc.). For comparable periods 1945-1965, Brown's and our data have comparable items, some being iden-tical; but if one excludes his 'exiled inventions,' his list 
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is much shorter. In other words, while his own data does 
not verify his case, neither would a more systematic analysis 
with the same sources have done so. 
A FEW FACTS THAT CONTEST BROWN'S IDEAS 
A few sets of facts that companies have confirmed to the 
Science Council which contest J.J. Brown's contention are: 
in certain industries 
(i) Canadian firms claim numerous 'world firsts;' 
(ii) Canadian firms claim an even more surprising 
ratio of world seconds amongst the total of 
the technological changes adopted from abroad; 
(iii) Small firms in Canada perform, as in other 
countries, a large share of the innovations 
in many industries. 
'World firsts' are innovations for which the manufacturer 
knows of no precedent in the world. These comprise approxi-
mately 40% of the total innovations. However, given that 
firms may be biased, the facts still require cross-checking 
with another source. Among these world firsts, there are 
also innovations which were not resounding commercial succes-
ses, second generation improvement of foreign innovations, 
innovations of secondary commercial importance, others of 
secondary technical impact, as well as those of genuine world 
importance. The innovations still have to be graded and e- . 
valuated and the degree of commercial success of each innova-
tion has yet to be established. But one thing is immediately 
apparent: there is no lack of contention by Canadian firms 
of being 'world firsts,' which is a sign of the existence of 
entrepreneurial endeavours in Canada. Roughly half of these 
Canadian world firsts were developed in-house; probably a 
higher proportion yet, were developed in Canada. This evi-
dence of world firsts is enough to weaken Brown's contention 
that Canadians are inventors but not innovators and hence 
ideas go into exile. 
Secondly, almost as interesting is the data relating to the 
lag in adoption of foreign technology. Contrary to common 
belief, there is very little economic advantage of being the 
first to pioneer an innovation over being an early adopter. 
The entrepreneurial profit comes at the beginning of the dif-
fusion curve before 50% of the production is done with a 
new process. This, then, comes to determine the mean produc-
tion price in the industry after the initial debugging of a 
process. 
Technologically, the early part of the learning curve is the 
most propitious for acquiring technological know-how. It is 
at this stage when the major cost-saving improvements and 
modifications which stabilize a process or a product design 
into a standard form, are introduced. The very early R & D 
endeavours not only have little economic benefits but have 
little technological learning benefits. 
The approach of the Japanese is instructive in this respect. 
They systematically screen all new but established products 
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and inventions and choose the most promising to import in an unbundled form (machines, products, materials, technologists, engineers, and professors}. In this way, they collectively acquire and assimilate the knowledge and know-how related to that technology. This practice is based on the understanding that one gains more from adopting, adapting and learning early from foreign technology than from duplicating original path breaking R & D work. 
Similarly, Canada's reliance on foreign technology was con-sciously cultivated in the past. Canadian government policy on industrialization was based on attracting technology from a more advanced area rather than indigenous technological • development.15 This model is consistent with our claim that Canada is an early adopter. But a startling fact revealed by our data is that when we adopt foreign technology, we are often the second in the world in many areas. What is the validity of our data? Perhaps firms report more when they are second and less when they are third or fourth. 
The examination of our data shows, however, that the indus-tries in which we are world seconds are areas of relative strength: non-ferrous metal smelting, iron and steel, pulp-ing, some industrial chemicals, etc. Furthermore, we are seconds with foreign subsidiaries, Canadian multinationals and independents. There appears to be a consistent behaviour. 
Raymond Vernon's research group on multinationals at Harvard University Business School has recently released the prelim-inary results of a study started in 1974 that indicates simi-lar results.1" He examined fifty-seven US multinationals and looked at 400 of their innovations and 400 imitations and traced the story of the establishment of the product lines around the world in their subsidiaries. Canada was more often than not the second in the world to get a product line. This is in agreement with our findings. 
Since the experience of the first plant enables one to iden-tify many of the cost saving possibilities, being second could procure for Canada an economic and learning advantage. For example, DuPont Canada established the second plant for an important intermediate nylon. Then, in order to bring down the US production plans to Canadian scale they introduced two innovations that have subsequently been used in all plants the world over; one of these is a major new catalyst they will not talk about even in patents. 
Aside from multinationals, the adoption of the oxygen steel-making process by Dofasco in the late Fifties after the Austrians had established the process, is another case in point. Early adoption is the adoption at the most beneficial moment in the life cycle of a technology from the point of view of economics and the learning curve. 
The data only allows us to pose the question: does Canada possess this potential advantage in certain areas? In order to determine the significance of being second in the world to adopt an innovation, we would need to qualify our data with 
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information on the lagtime between first commercialization 
of the innovation elsewhere and first adoption in Canada. 
However, lagtimes are variable and depend on the industry, 
business cycle, etc. But what is certain is that the set of 
facts we uncovered militate against Brown's thesis. If 
Canada lacked entrepreneurial and innovative nerve, then one 
would expect Canada to adopt foreign innovation promptly in 
any areas. The fact that Canada does, at least in certain 
industries such as steel and smelting, makes this thesis 
highly unlikely. 
Finally, we have found that small entrepreneurs in industries 
such as instruments, machinery, specialized transport equip-
ment, logging, and electronics contribute a heavy proportion 
of the innovations as in other western free market countries 
(see Table). In other words, the 'animal spirits' of cap-
italist free enterprise culture seem to be breeding quite 
well in the Canadian environment. If Brown's thesis about 
entrepreneurial and innovative failure were true, one should 
not expect the small operator-owned enterprise to be involved 
in innovation. 
TABLE 
PERCENTAGE OF INNOVATIONS IN EACH INDUSTRY .BY SIZE OF FIRM 1 7 
Number Industry 1-19 
Employment Size 
20-199 200-499 
(# of Employees) 
500-999 1000 
165 Plastics fabricating 
industries 
8.3 66.7 25.0 0.0 0.0 
251 Saw mills, planing 
mills & shingle mills 
0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
271 Pulp & paper mills 5.3 31.6 17.5 3.5 42.1 
291 Iron & steel mills 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 88.9 
295 Smelting & refining 5.6 22.2 11.1 16.7 38.9 
308 Machine shops 14.3 85.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
315 Machinery & equipment 14.5 36.4 27.3 18.2 1.8 
321 Aircraft & aircraft 
parts manufacturers 
1.2 4.9 3.7 28.4 61.7 
373 Manufacturers of plas- 0.0 
tics & synthetic resins 
50.0 8.3 0.0 41.7 
378 Manufacturers of indus-
trial chemicals 
- 6.3 37.5 18.8 6.3 31.3 
3782 Industrial chemicals 
(inorganic) 
1.5 0.0 1.5 10.6 83.3 
3783 Industrial chemicals 
(organic) 
0.0 53.3 33.3 0.0 13.3 
391 Scientific & profes-
sional equipment 
industries 
25.0 65.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 
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A more probable feature of innovation in Canada suggested by our survey is its customs orientation. Innovative small firms seem to have difficulty in making the transition from producing for a client to producing for a market. Cases of such transitions are rare: thé snowmobile, the four-wheel articulated skidder, the chip'n saw, the factory-built mobile home, etc. The problem in Canada would not be so much the lack of entrepreneurial nerve as the barriers to entry and industrial growth. It is not so much the lack of small in-novative firms but that of survival and growth of medium-sized ones. 
CONCLUSION 
Before studying the specific features for innovation in Canada, it is necessary to know simply what innovation exists. We have found from our research that technological innovation exists in Canada and is pervasive. However, in order to ex-amine the scope of failure, we must establish what the suc-cesses are and where the innovative potential lies. This is what we have started to do at the Science Council. 
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1946: Orenda engines for small aircraft and standby 
power plants (S); 
1948: Digital recorder for measuring speed of paper 
webs (Electronic Associates) (S); 
1949: Avon jetliner (E); 
1950: Oxygen process in steel making (Dofasco) (S) ; 
1951: Cobalt 60 cancer therapy units (AECL) (S); 
1952: Aluminum-sheathed high voltage oil-filled cable 
(Canada Wire and Cable) (S); 
1954: Oil well pump driven by natural gas pressure 
(James Green) (E); 
1955: Improved C-frame betameter for measuring weight 
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